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Entrepreneurs of the self: the development of management control 
since 1976 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This review article considers some of the key management control articles published in AOS through 
ƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůůĞŶƐŽĨ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚà?Ɛà?à?à?à?à?à?ůĞĐƚƵƌĞƐŽŶneo-liberalism and biopolitics. In these lectures 
Foucault analyses the shift from classical liberalism to what he describes as American neo-liberalism, 
the birth of biopolitics and the understanding of humans as entrepreneurs of the self.  Foucault set 
out in the late 1970s what is now strikingly apparent in 2015 -- the spread of neo-liberalism 
ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůůǇƚŽĚŽŵĂŝŶƐǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞà“ŶŽŶ-ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐà?à?ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇà?ĂŶĚĨŽƌ
the purposes of this paper, to human-beings.     
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^ŝŶĐĞK^à?ƐŝŶĂƵŐƵration in 1976, accounting, organisations and society have each undergone 
significant changes.  AOS began at the tail end of Fordism and the early days of the neo-liberal 
revolutionary era.  ƵƌŝŶŐK^à?Ɛlifetime, various forms of neo-liberalism have become ubiquitous, 
and the economic elites so powerful, that capitalism has followed a path of increasing economic, 
political, and cultural domination, arguably, to the point that, today, it controls the most intimate 
strands of every living body in all corners of the world (Hardt and Negri , 2001).   The injurious 
effects of neo-liberalism -- intensified inequality (Piketty, 2014), the unethical commercialization of 
arenas previously considered inappropriate for marketization (for example Cooper and Taylor, 2005; 
Taylor and Cooper, 2008), and the economic havoc unleashed on the economy by the ascendance 
and liberty of finance capital, (Brown, 2015; Cooper, 2015), have been widely analysed.  The concern 
of this paper is with the management control literature in AOS, and more specifically with K^à?Ɛ
reflection of ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĐŽŶƚƌŽůà?Ɛ role as a portal and/or agent for the globally ubiquitous spread 
of neo-liberalism and particularly on its consequent impact on many employees, which, as will be 
argued in the paper, have been profound and deleterious.  
 
In a powerful account of work in the neo-liberal era, Cederstrom and Fleming (2012) argue that, in a 
wide range of occupations, both at the top and the bottom of organisational hierarchies, work is 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚĂƐĂà“ůŝǀŝŶŐĚĞĂƚŚà?à?The majority work for longer hours, less pay, fewer benefits, less 
security, and less promise of retirement and upward mobility (Brown, 2015).   But there is something 
deeper at play.  Neo-liberal mentality has reconfigured humans from being waged/salaried 
employees to human capital --entrepreneurs of the self (Foucault, 2010).  In a sense, life itself has 
been put to work1-- our sociality, imagination, resourcefulness, and our desire to learn and share 
ideas.   Corporations increasingly strive to harness these very human characteristics to drive value 
but neo-liberal subjects have a hyper individualised expectation placed upon them to maximise 
returns on themselves.  In practice, the majority have both a boss who gives orders, and an 
overwhelming management control system to deal with2.  It could be that this dual (and 
contradictory) pressure, to be entrepreneurial while also being closely controlled, is at least part of 
the reason behind the anguish suffered across all organisational levels described by Cederstrom and 
Fleming (2012). dŚŝƐŝƐŽǀĞƌůĂŝĚďǇƚŚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶà?Kà?ŽŚĞƌƚǇĂŶĚtŝůůŵŽƚƚà?
2002), performance related pay, zero-hour contracts, falling real wages, the removal of state safety 
nets and so on.    
 
Accounting can serve as a crucial technology of neo-liberalism (see for example, Arnold, 2009; 
Arnold, 2012; Covaleski et al, 2013; Jupe, 2012).  It enables the rationalities of neo-liberalism to pass 
through and thereby transform the organisation and create new organisational practices (Hopwood, 
1987) targeted at the workforce.   Management control systems play an important role in controlling 
and providing individualised ranking of à“entrepreneurs of the selfà? as well as providing the 
technologies which create the growing divisions in wealth and income.    
 
In the transition from Fordism to neo-liberalism, there are accounting continuities and 
discontinuities; management control continues with the roles it played under Fordism (control, 
individualisation, providing costing information and so on); but some of its technologies are new and 
importantly constitute subjects in a very different way.   Under neoliberalism people are construed 
on the model of the firm and are accordingly expected to act in ways that maximize their (human) 
capital value, through entrepreneurialism, self-investment and/or attracting investors/networking 
(Brown, 2015).  
 
                                                          
1 This is biopolitics 
2 Under Fordism workers could menƚĂůůǇƚĞůůƚŚĞďŽƐƐƚŽà“ĨƵĐŬŽĨĨà?ĂƐƚŚĞǇůĞĨƚƚŚĞĨĂĐƚŽƌǇà?dƵƌŶŝŶŐ-off is no 
longer an available option àW 40 years ago weekends and leisure time were still relatively untouched, now the 
majority take work home with them (Cederstrom and Fleming, 2012).   
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dŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨà“ƉƵƚƚŝŶŐůŝĨĞŝƚƐĞůĨƚŽǁŽƌŬà?ǁĂƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇDŝĐŚĞů&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚĂƐbiopower.  Foucault 
was a professor at the Collège de France from 1971 until 1984 when he died.  The rules of the 
Collège are that professors must annually deliver 26 hours of public lectures.  The dominant 
theoretical perspective in this paper comes from the lectures which Foucault gave for the year 
1978/9 on the birth of biopolitics. In these lectures Foucault begins to painstakingly distinguish 
biopolitics from disciplinary power (Di Vittorio, 2005, 102 àW 103; Reyes-Zaga, 2014).  Foucault set out 
in the 1970s what is now blindingly obvious in 2015.  Although it is impossible to do justice to 
&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚà?ƐĞǆƚƌĂŽƌĚŝŶĂƌŝůǇƉƌĞƐĐŝĞŶƚůĞĐƚƵƌĞƐà?ƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌƌĞ-considers some of the key management 
control articles in AOS through the theoretical lens of neo-liberalism presented in his lectures.  It is 
also impossible to do justice to every management control paper published in AOS.  On the premise 
that academic research both reflects and constitutes accounting practice, this review paper aims to 
consider at a micro level the roles and processes of, and the rhetoric behind, accountingà?ƐƌŽůĞƐ in 
displacing the management function onto newly entrepreneurialised workers at all levels of the 
organisation.  It also considers how work in AOS has dealt with the impact of newly configured 
management control technologies on the individual and the spaces for resistance.  The paper turns 
ĨŝƌƐƚƚŽDŝĐŚĞů&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚà?ƐůĞĐƚƵƌĞƐŽŶďŝŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐǁŚŝĐŚƐĞƚŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵà?
While these rationalities are important for the argumentation in this paper, the economic context of 
neoliberalism (capitalism) cannot be ignored. Capitalism dominates the human beings and human 
worlds it organises (Brown, 2015). 
 
 
&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?ƐďŝŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ and neo-liberalism 
 
Neoliberalism is not stable or unified.  It ranges and changes temporally and geographically and is 
still being made and remade. The problem of defining neo-liberalism is not solved by Michel 
&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚà?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨit.  But &ŽƵĐĂƵůƚà?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĞŽ-liberalism brackets it in a useful way.  
Foucault conceives neoliberalism as an order of normative reason that, when it becomes ascendant, 
takes shape as a governing rationality extending a specific formulation of economic values, practices, 
and metrics to every dimension of human life (Brown, 2015).  Brown (2015) notes that this 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐǁŚĂƚĂůŝƐŬĂŶĂŶĚĂůůŽŶà?à?à?à à?à?à?à?à?à?à?ƚĞƌŵƚŚĞà“ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝƐĂƚŝŽŶà?ŽĨ
heretofore noneconomic spheres and practices, a process of remaking the knowledge, form, 
content, and conduct appropriate to these spheres and practices.  This economization of arenas 
previously considered as inappropriate for marketization has been considered by academic 
accounting research (for example Callon, 2009; Muniesa, and Linhardt, 2011; Poon, 2009; Samuel et 
al, 2005) but while the à“ŵĂƌŬĞƚà? tĞƌŵà“ŚƵŵĂŶĐĂƉŝƚĂůà?ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ fairly frequently in AOS, it is analysed 
here as a very specific neo-liberal concept. 
 
Humans as human capital 
 
&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚà?Ɛbiopolitics, set out the neo-liberal mode of thought in which humans are reconfigured 
from being waged employees to entrepreneurs of the self.   He states that neo-liberals argue that 
although classical economists have always seen production as depending on land, capital and labour, 
that labour has been left either unexplored or dealt with in an abstract way3.  Foucault discusses the 
attempts by Theodore Schultz, Gary Becker and Jacob Mincer and other Rational Choice theorists to 
bring labour into the field of economic analysis ŝŶĂà“ŶŽŶ-ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚǁĂǇà?à?   To neo-liberals work must 
be studied as economic conduct practiced, implemented, rationalized, and calculated by the person 
who works. The worker is not present in economic analysis as an objectà? the object of supply and 
demandà? but as an active economic subject.  Foucault (2010, pp 223/4) explains that neo-liberal 
mentality cannot see any reason to work except to produce an income.  In their analysis of income 
                                                          
3 Foucault argues that although Marx placed labour at the centre of his theoretical work, the American neo-
ůŝďĞƌĂůƐǁŽƵůĚƐĞĞDĂƌǆà?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂƐƚŽŽà“ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚà?à? 
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neo-liberals refer to the (early twentieth century) definition, of Irving Fisher, who said that an 
income is simply the product or return on a capital.  Under neo-ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵà“ĂƉŝƚĂůà?has come to 
mean a source of future income (Cooper, 2015).   From the side of the worker, labour is not a 
commodity reduced by abstraction to the time which it is used.   The neo-liberal understanding of a 
worker is a conception of capital-ability which, according to diverse variables receives a certain 
income so that the worker appears as an enterprise for herself.  Neo-liberal human capital includes 
both genetic and acquired elements.  The genetic elements, akin to social Darwinism, are such that 
individuals achieve advantage over others as the result of genetic or biological superiority; the 
acquired elements include education and other investments in the self.  Importantly, inequality, not 
equality, is the medium and relation of competing capitals.  When we are configured as human 
capital, equality ceases to be our presumed natural relation with one another (Brown, 2015).  
Humans lose their standing as being simply valuable as humans.   
 
ƐŝĚĞĨƌŽŵƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐŚƵŵĂŶƐĂƐà“ŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇƵŶĞƋƵĂůà?à?the neo-liberal vision of human capital 
further serves to distort a class perspective.  One of the social contradictions of neoliberalism is that 
the majority are employees -- not just human capital for themselves but also for their employers 
and/or shareholders.  Human capital is at once in charge of itself, responsible for itself, yet an 
instrumentalizable and potentially dispensable element of the whole.  And when humans are cast as 
capital, labour disappears as a category, as does its collective form, class, taking with it the analytic 
basis for alienation, exploitation and association among labourers (Brown, 2015, p 38).  Moreover, 
the neo-liberal hyper-individualised rationality serves to efface what Marx described as the forces 
and relations of production àW the capitalist class own the means of production, while the majority 
can only survive by selling their labour while the owners of the means of production profit from their 
labour. 
 
The neo-liberal conception of à“ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞůĨà?is one in which human action is animated 
by rewards or future rewards.   Foucault (2010, p 270), makes the connection between this and the 
work of behavioural psychologists like Skinner stating ƚŚĂƚà“à?ǇŽƵĐĂŶƐĞĞƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ
integrating within economics a set of techniques, those called behavioural techniques, which are 
currently in fashion in the United States. You find these methods in their purest, most rigorous, 
strictest or aberrant forms, as you wish, in Skinner, and precisely they do not consist in analysing the 
meaning of different kinds of conduct, but simply in seeing how, through mechanisms of 
reinforcement, a given play of stimuli entail responses whose systematic nature can be observed and 
on the basis of which other variables of behaviour can be introduced.à? 
 
The pursuit of individual wealth maximisation as a moral practice 
 
The neo-liberal understanding of humans as animated by income is supplemented by the belief that 
individuals should strive to maximize their individual wealth.  Rather than seeing individual wealth 
maximising ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂƐà“ŐƌĞĞĚǇà?-- it is moralà?dŚŝƐŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇŝƐďĂƐĞĚƵƉŽŶĚĂŵ^ŵŝƚŚà?ƐŝŶǀŝƐŝďůĞ
hand, which in a neo-liberal grid means that humans maximise social wealth by maximising their 
own wealth.  Foucault states (2010, p 277) that neo-liberal rationality is that each person is 
dependent on an uncontrollable, unspecified whole of the flow of things and the world.  At the same 
ƚŝŵĞà?ĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůà?ƐŝŶƚerest, without her knowing, wishing, or being able to control it, is linked to a 
series of positive effects which mean that everything which is to her advantage will turn out to be to 
ƚŚĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐà?tŚĂƚŝƐƵƐƵĂůůǇƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚŝŶ^ŵŝƚŚà?ƐĨĂŵŽƵƐƚŚĞory of the invisible hand is 
the existence of something like providence which would tie together all the dispersed threads.  To 
Foucault (2010), invisibility is absolutely indispensable to neo-liberal argumentation.  Invisibility 
means that no economic agent should try to pursue the à“collective goodà?.  Political power (the state) 
must not interfere with this dynamic naturally inscribed in the heart of man. Under this mentality, 
the state is accordingly prohibited from obstructing market mechanisms, though, for example, the 
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payment of unemployment benefits which would distort the efficient functioning of labour markets.    
The neo-ůŝďĞƌĂůà“ŵĂƌŬĞƚà?ŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚthe role of competition as a disciplining device is 
reduced if the state pursues social welfare policies4.   Foucault argues that from the point of view of 
the problem of power and of the legitimate exercise of power ŚŽŵŽƈĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƵƐ is radically new, 
although, over the last 40 years this conceptualisation of humanity has gradually become doxic. 
 
dŚĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ ?ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ? 
 
The accounting implications of the à“entrepreneurialisation of peopleà? are profound.  As Brown 
à?à?à?à?à?à?Ɖà?à?à?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐà?ŚƵŵĂŶĐĂƉŝƚĂůà?Ɛà“ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚĂŶĚƵďŝƋƵŝƚŽƵƐĂ ŵà?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƐƚƵĚǇŝŶŐà?ŝŶƚĞƌŶŝŶŐà?
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐà?ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐƌĞƚŝƌĞŵĞŶƚà?à?à?ŝƐƚŽĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌŝĂůŝǌĞŝƚƐĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌƐà?ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞŝƚƐǀĂůƵĞà?ĂŶĚ
increase its rating or ranking.  In this it mirrors the mandate for contemporary firms, countries, 
academic departments or journals, universities, media or websites: entrepreneurialize, enhance 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŐĂŶĚǀĂůƵĞà?ŵĂǆŝŵŝǌĞƌĂƚŝŶŐƐŽƌƌĂŶŬŝŶŐƐà?à?EĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵƚƌĂŶƐŵŽŐƌŝĨŝĞƐ
humanity according to a specific image of the economic.  All conduct is economic conduct; all 
spheres of existence are framed by economic terms and metrics (even when those spheres are not 
directly monetized).  Accordingly, aĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐà?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĂŶĚŶŽŶ-financial performance metrics, 
ratios, balanced-scorecards and other technologies, play a role in producing an account of the value 
of our human capital, its ranking, position and so on.  From a managerialist perspective accounting 
metrics hold the promise of an ability to motivate, monitor and rank the endeavours of employees; 
under neo-liberalism the targets of these metrics are not waged employees but income maximizing 
entrepreneurial units of human capital. 
 
How to make agents self-monitor and motivate is an enduring management accounting concern 
(Herzberg, 1968).   Baiman (1990) notes that, agency theory states that, it is best if agents self-
monitor in the interests of the principal.  It might seem as if accounting metrics which give 
entrepreneurial human capital units information about their performance rankings so that they can 
maximize their current and/or future income may be a à“ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶà?ƚŽƚŚŝƐpersistent management 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵà?/ŶĚĞĞĚà?ĂŐĞŶĐǇƚŚĞŽƌǇà?ƐĚƵĂůŝƐŵŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůŝƐƌŝƐŬ-neutral while agents are risk-
averse (and so not naturally entrepreneurial) is in some senses made redundant by neo-liberal 
conceptions of agents.  A feature of neo-liberalism is that risk is pushed downwards to the most 
vulnerable.  However, when neo-liberal rationalities overlay the agency perspective, risk-averse 
agents need to be both made to be more entrepreneurial, and strictly controlled.  After all, 
entrepreneurialism may lead workers to act in ways which are inconsistent with the needs of their 
employers.  Paradoxically then, the neo-liberal view of humanity may invoke more managerialism 
and tighter management control systems.   This would depend upon the power of the groups 
involved.  Work in AOS has rejected technological determinism and economic imperatives as a 
satisfactory basis for explaining changes in the modes of management control; accounting controls 
are rooted in struggles as firms attempted to control labour processes in various epochs of 
capitalistic development (Hopper and Armstrong, 1981)5.  In spite of their differences, neo-liberal 
rationality shares a similar methodology to work which adopts the agency perspective. 
 
                                                          
4 Baiman (1990) ŐŝǀĞƐƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨà“ŚƵŵĂŶĐĂƉŝƚĂůà?-- a person with skills that are needed in a particular 
organisation, who cannot be easily replaced àW so can demand higher wages from their employer.  The 
ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚŝƐà“ŵĂƌŬĞƚŝŵƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶà?ǁŽƵůĚďĞƵŶĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚà?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƵŶĞŵƉůŽǇŵĞŶƚŽĨŚŝŐŚůǇƐŬŝůůĞĚ
people) which would enable the market to function better.   
5 The notion that searches for efficiency under the pressure of competitive markets were the primary drive 
behind the development of capitalistic organisations and scientific management is highly contentious and has 
been strongly disputed by historians and radical political economists, (e.g Montgomery, 1979, 1987; 
Braverman, 1974; Clawson, 1980; Nelson, 1974). 
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From a methodological perspective, neo-liberal ideas epitomize an extreme form of functionalism6 --
objectivism/behaviourism.  Neo-liberal methodology articulates with functionalist research in 
accounting which has an extremely high degree of commitment to models and methods derived 
from natural science, have a strong faith in markets, and adopt a Skinneristic atomised view of the 
individual as responding reflexively to incentive and monitoring schemes (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; 
Hopper and Armstrong, 1991).  The ability to include performance metrics in, for example, 
performance related pay contracts articulates well to ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚǁŽƌŬà?Ɛ à“^ŬŝŶŶĞƌŝƐƚŝĐà?ƉƌĞ-
occupation with the influence of incentive and monitoring systems and contracts on the behaviour 
of agents (Armstrong, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1985, 1988; Kosnick, 1987).   Research which adopted this 
functionalist methodology grew to become the mainstream or orthodox during the life of AOS.  
 
From its inception, AOS has published work from very different methodological paradigms. It 
established a space in accounting for non-orthodox (non-functionalist) perspectives to establish 
themselves so that their possibilities could be explored and understood.   AOS was a leader in 
ƉƵďůŝƐŚŝŶŐǁŽƌŬà?ƌŵƐƚƌŽŶŐà?à?à?à?à?à?à?à?à?à?à?DŝůůĞƌĂŶĚKà?>ĞĂƌǇà?à?à?à?à?à?Hoskin & Macve, 1986; Loft, 
1986; Merino & Neimark, 1982; Hopwood, 1987; Miller and Napier, 1993) which differentiated itself 
from orthodox work which saw accounting change as a process of technical elaboration and 
improvement.   AOS showed how organisational accounts are actively constructed as a powerful 
means for creating a particular economic visibility which facilitated management control along 
economic lines (Cooper, 1980, 1981; Hopper et al., 1986; Tinker, 1980; Tinker et al., 1982).  Further, 
it showed how accounting facts could be distanced from yet reflect the physical production 
processes (Cooper and Taylor, 2000; Miller and Napier, 1993).  Thus some of the early AOS work on 
management control systems saw that although accounting functions in organisations, accounting is 
something which is best understood as in the domain of the social rather than the narrowly 
organisational.   
 
AOS discouraged academic sectarianism, and encouraged high-quality dialogue and debate.  There is 
a stream of management control research within AOS much of which adopts a neo-functionalist view 
that management control systems should direct and motivate employees to act in accordance with 
organisational strategy; if they fail to do so then accounting technologies should be amended.  This 
research is also concerned with the relationship between management control technologies, 
organisational performance and management satisfaction.  SŽŵĞŽĨƚŚŝƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚà?ƐůĂƌŐĞĚĂƚĂƐĞƚƐà?
help to enhance wider understandings of the progressively increased use of and scope of 
management control systems under neo-liberalism frequently from a managerial perspective.   It 
also to some extent reflects the development of neo-liberal rationalities in the accounting literature.   
This more orthodox stream of research will be considered next. 
 
 
Contingency  ? linking strategy to control systems and organisational performance 
 
The contingency approach to the study of organisations came into prominence during the 1970s. 
Organisational research on individual motivation, job satisfaction, leadership style, organisation 
structure, technology and many other organisational variables was interpreted within the context of 
a managerially oriented set of propositions, which assert that the effective operation of an 
enterprise is dependent upon there being an appropriate fit between its internal organisation and 
the nature of the demands placed upon it by its tasks, its environment and the needs of its 
members. (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  A stream of work began in the 1970s in AOS and continues to 
this day, adopts this approach, ĂŶĚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚĂĐŽŵƉĂŶǇà?ƐƐƚƌategy or its 
value drivers align with its management control systems (for example, Chenhall, 2003; Chenhall and 
Langfield-Smith, 1998; Cadez and Guilding, 2008; Dent, 1990; Dermer, 1990; Gerdin, 2005; Gerdin 
                                                          
6 Ontologically realist; epistemologically positivist; extremely deterministic; methodologically nomothetic. 
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and Greve, 2004, 2008; Haka, 1987; Hartmann and Moers,1999; Henri, 2006; Ho et al, 2014; 
Merchant, 1984; Otley, 1980; Perera et al, 1997; Selto et al, 1995; Simons 1987, 1990; Langfield-
Smith, 1997).  The early focus of this research was on more senior management controls and their 
alignment with strategy (Langfield-Smith, 1997; Simons, 1987). But gradually reflected the trickle 
down of management control systems through middle management (Hopper and Armstrong, 1981) 
to increasingly lower levels of organisational hierarchies (e.g., Abernethy and Lillis, 1995; Abernethy 
& Brownell, 1997, 1999; Adler and Chen, 2011; Bisbe & Otley, 2004; Davila, 2000; Davila, Foster, & 
Li, 2009; Ditillo, 2004).  This work also charts the introduction and implementation of newer 
accounting technologies (targeted more at individuals) and mirrors the qualitative change in 
management control which developed substantially during the life of AOS in both the public and 
private sector (see for example, Grafton et al, 2010; Habersam et al, 2013; Ho et al, 2014) although, 
like neo-liberalism itself, there are cultural differences in the rate of adoption of new management 
control systems (Jansen et al, 2009).   
 
ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞà“ůŝŶŬĂŐĞƐà?between management control systems, strategy and performance is 
mixed (Adler and Chen, 2011; Ittner et al, 2003)).  The work in AOS demonstrates that while there 
may be the desire on the part of management to produce (for example) profit maximisation or 
shareholder value maximization (Chabrak, 2014), that management control systems may produce 
unintended negative consequence (eg Simons, 1987; Ittner and Larcker, 1997).   Negative 
consequences are frequently explained in functionalist terms àW lack of alignment to strategy and so 
on (Ittner and Larcker, 1997).   Interestingly, Ittner and Larcker (1997) specifically found that 
à“ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŵĞŶƚà?ǁŚŝĐŚĂůůŽǁƐǁŽƌŬĞƌƐƚŽbecome more entrepreneurial, form teams and 
select projects without management approval, may prevent organizations from identifying and 
implementing those improvement projects offering the highest potential contribution to overall 
business performance.   
 
A critical appraisal of the contingency work in AOS 
 
The body of AOS work which adopts a contingency approach to management control and/or 
measures the impact on organisational performance, outlined here, on the whole, could be 
categorised by Burrell and Morgan (1979) as belonging to the functionalist paradigm which assumes 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐŽƌĚĞƌĂŶĚƉĂƚƚĞƌŶĂŶĚŝƐŐĞĂƌĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐĂŶĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨà“ǁŚĂƚŝƐà?à? Newly 
introduced ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐĂƌĞƐŝŵƉůǇà“ƚĂŬĞŶ-for-granted.à? Research in this paradigm is 
virtually silent on the impact of management control on the well-being of the workforce.  Although a 
variant of this work built upon Cherns (1978) which was concerned about the quality of working life.   
Cherns (1978) adopted the position that that a more humane working situation is a functional 
imperative within the context of the system as a whole.  In its depiction of humanity, the 
contingency work, while not adopting the language of workers as entrepreneurs (although it does 
ƵƐĞà“ŚƵŵĂŶĐĂƉŝƚĂůà?à?does contain some of neo-liberalisms rationalities.  It is Skinneristic in its 
treatment of human actors in its concern to find the most efficient mechanisms to make humans 
achŝĞǀĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůŐŽĂůƐà?tŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚŝƐŝƐŝŶĂà“ŚƵŵĂŶĞà?ǁĂǇ(akin to Cherns, 1978) or through 
the implementation of techniques with virtually no concern about the impact on workers except in 
as much as they fulfil organisational objectives.   
 
Most contingency work adopts a regulative stance which is concerned to make piecemeal 
adjustments and accepts the status quo as given àW there are no alternatives to neo-liberalism.    
Explanation in functional theory is teleological in that functional problems are assumed to call forth 
their own solution, with no explanation of how this is actually accomplished (Armstrong, 1991).   
 
Research with a very different methodology with respect to management control, perhaps more 
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƵƌƌĞůůĂŶĚDŽƌŐĂŶà?ƐƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇŽĨƌĂĚŝĐĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞà?ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞĚŚĞĂǀŝůǇĞĂƌůǇŝŶƚŚĞůŝĨĞŽĨ
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AOS.  This work was clear that accounting reflected and served certain economic and political 
interests (for example, Cooper and Shearer, 1984; Coveleski and Aitken, 1986; Hopper and 
Armstrong, 1981; Lehman and Tinker, 1987; Neimark and Tinker, 1986; Toms, 2005; Tinker et al, 
1982).  Tinker et al, (1982) p 192, stated that ƚŚĞà“ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨŐŝǀŝŶŐĚƵĞǁĞŝŐŚƚƚŽƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂů
context of accounting becomes even more apparent if we recognize that, to date, when accounting 
has affected the work-lives of employees, it has done so overwhelmingly on behalf of corporations 
and employers. Budgeting, motivating, coordinating and planning are methods for controlling the 
behavior of people within organizations. The traditional areas of cost and management accounting 
(together with more recent approaches based on industrial psychology and organization theory) 
have escaped virtually Scot-ĨƌĞĞĨƌŽŵĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƐŽĐŝĂůĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂůà?à?In its insistence that it is important to 
remember that on the whole, large corporations own the means of production and so the majority 
work for someone else, this early worŬƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂƚŽŽůĨŽƌà“ƌĞŵĞŵďĞƌŝŶŐà? the importance of class in 
the face of the seeming eradication of class relations by neo-liberal rationalities. 
 
Unlike the more functionalist work in AOS, it is important to the labour process theorists that 
managĞŵĞŶƚƉŽǁĞƌŝƐŶà?ƚƐŝŵƉůǇƚĂŬĞŶĨŽƌŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ.  Armstrong (1991, p 6) argues that within à“the 
capitalist social relations of production, the most basic contradiction arises because employers and 
managers are faced with the inescapable problem of achieving co-operative activity by antagonistic 
means. Because there is always a necessary element of voluntary activity in any system of co-
operation this contradiction can never be finally overcome within capitalism.à?   This contradiction 
applies to management too, AƌŵƐƚƌŽŶŐà?à?à?à?à?à?Ɖà?à?ĂƌŐƵĞƐà?à“ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĂŶĚà“ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶà?
groups may possess short-run interests which are imperfectly aligned with, although not, of course, 
independent of, those of capital ownershipà?à?Nonetheless, it is the role of management to continue 
to attempt to overcome these social contradictions.   
 
With the development of neo-liberalism, as reflected in the AOS contingency literature noted above, 
accounting has transformed from cost accounting which was concerned with the calculation of 
product costings for pricing policy rather than for example manufacturing strategy (Hopper and 
Armstrong, 1981) towards management accounting ĂŶĚŵŽƌĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŝƐĞĚà“ŚƵŵĂŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐà?
metrics.  In effect there has been a shift towards management accounts targeted at the conduct of 
individuals rather than (for example) pricing strategy, although this is still important. AOS work 
which considers the shift in accounting from costing to management control is considered next. 
 
 
Control and  ?EŽƌŵĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? of Entrepreneurial Subjects - the shift from cost to management 
accounting 
AOS research provides some compelling albeit necessarily incomplete explanations concerning 
ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐà?ƐƌŽůĞ and power in both individualising people and at the same time animating them to 
à“unwittingly collude with powerà?.  Work in AOS and elsewhere has been concerned with how 
individuals seem to so readily accept a reductionist numerical accounting vision of the self (Collier, 
2005; Dixon and Gaffikin, 2014; Edgley, 2014; Farjaudon and Morales, 2013; Hammond et al, 2012; 
Lehman, 2013; Roberts, 2005; 2009; Upton and Arrington, 2012).  In a historical analysis of the 
ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨà“ĐŽƐƚ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐà?ŝŶƚŽà“ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐà?à?DŝůůĞƌĂŶĚEĂƉŝĞƌà?à?à?à?à?à?7 sets 
                                                          
7 Interestingly, Miller and Napier (1993), charts another important change which occurred after the UK 
Conservative government election in 1979.  Up until this point, there was some momentum behind the 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨà“ǀĂůƵĞĂĚĚĞĚƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐà?ǁŚŝĐŚƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĞĚƚŚƌĞĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚuents in the construction of value àW 
capital, labour and the state.  After 1979, these three arenas were abruptly transformed.  In particular, state 
ƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƐŚŽƵůĚƐŚƌŝŶŬà?ĂŶĚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇŶŽƚà“ŝŶƚĞƌĨĞƌĞà?ŝŶƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐà?ŶĚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐon 
which industrial relations were to be operated were fundamentally and painfully altered according to the neo-
liberal rationality that nothing should be allowed to interfere in markets.   
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management accounting within a complex set of practices (IQ scores, BMI indices, and so on) which 
place individuals within statistical distributions, and measure and calibrate them according to norms.  
Once (for example), a BMI score is taken to represent a very complex human being, it is only a short 
step to accepting a management control metric as representing the ranking and/or value of a 
human.  Numerical (and other) rankings are ubiquitous under neo-liberalism.  Fourcade and Healy 
(2013) argue that in the neoliberal era market institutions increasingly use actuarial techniques to 
split and sort individuals into classification situations that shape life-chances. More recent work in 
AOS attests to the ubiquity of performance measures (Dambrin and Robson, 2011; Artz, Homburg, 
and Rajab 2012).   
 
/ŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞà“ƉŽǁĞƌà?ŽĨŶƵŵĞƌŝĐĂůŵĞƚƌŝĐƐŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇà?Knights and Collinson (1987) identify 
the class-specific power of accounting, by showing the disciplinary power of financial accounts over 
male manual workers.  Financial numbers refer to an economic reality to which male manual 
workers are especially sensitive and vulnerable. Although workers resisted psychological discipline 
from human resources managers, workers self-subjected to the numbers, as they share materialist 
and unambiguous characteristics with them. 
 
There is an emotional edge to accounting which is seldom recognised (Boedker and Chua, 2013).  
Some of the most powerful work in AOS, which considers the potent impact of performance metrics 
on individual angst and emotions, draws from Lacanian psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1979).  Lacan's 
human subject is an anxious one with imaginary relations and an empty core, whose continuing and 
overwhelming desire is for à“confirmation of selfhoodà?à?Unfortunately, nothing can ever truly satisfy 
this desire because recognition from others is always fleeting and temporary.  A Lacanian insight into 
the implications of the atomised reductionist management accounting field of vision, is that 
accounting metrics become mirrors in which individual humans are reflected. Management 
accounting constructs a field of visibility through which individuals and/or groups can be made 
visible and accordingly compared, differentiated, hierarchized, homogenized and/or excluded/fired 
(Roberts, 2005).   According to Lacanian theory individuals have a preoccupation with how they are 
seen and judged and this preoccupation is intensely individualising.  Numerical metrics can offer the 
hope of fulfilling our overwhelming desire for reflection (I would kill to achieve ƚŚĞŝůůƵƐŝǀĞà“à?à?à? 
rating).  Accounting can set standards and measures which tell us what is normal, reflect us, 
measure us, aim to embed social hierarchies and understandings within us, make us fearful, direct 
our efforts and offer the hope of fulfilling our insatiable desire for reflection and to control.  The 
effects of accounting control systems are dependent upon the context in which they operate.    
Identification collapses the space for resistance for it is through such identification that we inscribe 
the power relation within the self (Roberts, 2005).  Although resistance is integral to this process, in 
part through the felt necessity to defend our imagined autonomy against the intrusion of others 
such resistance can take the form of what Zizek (2000, p 252) calls a 'deadly mutual embrace' that 
binds me ever more tightly to that which I resist (Roberts, 2005).   
 
Aside from its explanation of how accounting metrics come to have an extreme impact on those 
subjected to them, Lacan offers a further insight into management control from the perspective of 
those with organizational superiority over others.  The Lacanian subject is desperate to control or at 
least to feel in control. Lacan suggests that this kind of desire is what Freud was trying to grasp in the 
concept of death drive, the drive towards negativity (Cooper, 1992).  While management control 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐǁŝůůŶĞǀĞƌďĞĂďůĞƚŽƐĂƚŝƐĨǇƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌà“ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐĞůĨŚŽŽĚà?ŽƌƚŽŵĂŬĞƵƐĨĞĞů
completely in control, increasingly sophisticated management control systems are incredibly 
seductive in that they continually offer the promise of complete control.  This understanding reflects 
some of the contŝŶŐĞŶĐǇǁŽƌŬà?ƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚare satisfied with performance 
management sysems (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Govindarajan, 1988; Govindarajan and 
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Gupta, 1985; Ittner and Larcker, 1997; Shields and Shields, 1998).  This appears to be the case except 
when managers are subject to them (Ittner and Larcker, 1997). 
 
 
Summary 
 
This section draws from work which describes the complex, seductive and potentially destructive 
relationship between management control information and human-beings.  Lacanian theory 
provides an explanation of the power of management control technologies that differs from versions 
of disciplinary power that rely upon discourse to describe the ways in which power is constitutive of 
subjectivity (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000; Grant et al., 1998; Hardy et al., 2000).  In this, the 
>ĂĐĂŶŝĂŶǁŽƌŬƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚà?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
entrepreneurial subject.  Individualised metrics will be more powerful in a society obsessed by 
rankings, individual accomplishment and entrepreneurialism.  It is therefore essential when trying to 
understand the practices of accounting in a neo-liberal world to investigate the operation of 
accounting at the level of practice.  There are many ways in which humans might react to different 
management control systems in different organisational, political and economic contexts.  The next 
section accordingly considers the insights derived from some of the key research into the practice of 
management control published in AOS. 
 
Accounting in practice 
One of the key AOS articles which presented a longitudinal case analysis of a company which 
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽŵĂŬĞŝƚƐǁŽƌŬĞƌƐŵŽƌĞĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌŝĂůŝƐDŝůůĞƌĂŶĚKà?>ĞĂry (1994).  This section pays 
particular attention to this case and other cases which consider management accounting practice.   
In particular it considers the relationship between the constitution of subjectivity and the economic 
system.  With regards to the economic, it teases out some of the social contradictions of neo-
liberalism exposed by the work in AOS. 
 
Caterpillar 
DŝůůĞƌĂŶĚKà?>ĞĂƌǇà?à?à?à?à?à?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂ case study which sets out the endeavour to reconstruct workers 
as entrepreneurial units of human capital (albeit in embryonic form in the guise of à“ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐà?à?ŝŶƚŚĞĞĐĂƚƵƌƉůĂŶƚŽĨh^ŵƵůƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƚĞƌƉŝůůĂƌ ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌà“WůĂŶƚtŝƚŚĂ&uture (PWAF) 
programme.  The workforce/new economic citizens8 were to be empowered/entrpreneurialised so 
as to be able to confront the exigencies of global competition in a direct mediated and personal 
ĨĂƐŚŝŽŶà?dŚĞǀŝƐŝŽŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŝŶDŝůůĞƌĂŶĚKà?>ĞĂƌǇà?à? à?à?à?ŝƐŽƉƚŝŵŝƐƚŝĐĂŶĚǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚ
what Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) ĂƌŐƵĞŝƐƚŚĞà“ŶĞǁƐƉŝƌŝƚŽĨĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵà?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵ
recognises that it will face increasing problems unless it provides some grounds for hope to those 
ǁŚŽƐĞĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝƐŶĞĞĚĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞà?dŚĞà“ŚŽƉĞà?ǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐǁŽƵůĚ
ĐƌĞĂƚĞĂà“ǀŝƌƚƵŽƵƐĐŝƌĐůĞà?ĂůŝŐŶŝŶŐĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐǁŽƌŬƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐĂŶĚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĐŽŶƚrol systems to 
improve both the profitability of Caterpillar and the global competitiveness of the region and the 
nation.   For many of the workforce, the hope was to preserve their jobs. 
 
The Caterpillar case sets out how the physical reconfiguration of the factory and the formation of 
new manufacturing cells/modules were ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞà“ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌƐà?à?dŚĞŶĞǁ
cells/modules were to be understood as small businesses or spaces for collective entrepreneurship 
by their workers (cell proprietors).  Caterpillar management put forward a case to the workforce that 
                                                          
8 DŝůůĞƌĂŶĚKà?>ĞĂƌǇà?à?à?à?à?à?Ɖà?à?à?ƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚŐŝǀĞŶà“ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝƚĞ Ğgulatory institutions, shop-floor workers, 
supervisors and middle-managers can become new kinds of economic actors with the advent of advanced, 
ĨůĞǆŝďůĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶà?à? 
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ƚŚĞŝƌh^ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐà?ĐŽƐƚƐǁĞƌĞƚŽŽŚŝŐŚĂŶĚƐŽĞĂĐŚĐĞůůǁŽƵůĚďĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚǁŝƚŚ
information to enable it to compare its individual component costs with those of its main competitor 
(Komatsu).  What might previously have been described as management concerns (foreign exchange 
exposure and so on) were transferred to the workforce.  Cost cutting targets were to become 
essential benchmarks of performance.  A cost measurement mechanism was devised to disentangle 
"permanent" cost reductions from the effects of inflation, currency fluctuations, and shifts in volume 
and mix of output.  MilůĞƌĂŶĚKà?>ĞĂƌǇà?Ɖà?à?à?ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůƐƚà?à“ƚŚĞ
Executive Offices might propose plans and coordinate results, according to Executive Vice President 
Schlegel, they would not "dictate to operating units the method for reducing costs". Means of 
ĂĐĐŽŵƉůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚĂŶĚƐŚŽƵůĚà?ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂƚĞǁŝƚŚŝŶĞĂĐŚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶà?à?à? 
 
MilůĞƌĂŶĚKà?>ĞĂƌǇà?à?à?à?à?à?ĂĚĚƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƵĂůĚĞƚĂŝůŽŶŚŽǁĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨŽƌŵƐŽĨŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂŶĚ
ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŵĂŬĞà“ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂďůĞƉĞƌƐŽŶà?possible à?DŝůůĞƌĂŶĚKà?>ĞĂƌǇà?à?à?à?à?à?à?dŚĞĐĂƐĞĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ
the multiple agents involved in the neo-liberal project of entrepreneurialising workers.  The agents  
included management consulting organisations, trade unions, and the state.  The broader context, 
ǁŽƵůĚĨƌŽŵƚŽĚĂǇà?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞà?ďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶà?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƐĞĞůĂƌŝĚĂĂŶĚ
Hickok, 1993) financialisation (see for example, Bay et al, 2014; Cooper, 2014; Zhang and Andrew, 
2014), and the widespread adoption of financial economic rationalities (Guénin-Paracini and 
Gendron, 2010).  There was a stated à“ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞà?ďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞ changes -- both the US 
government and Caterpillar expressed concern about falling profits and threats from Japanese 
ŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚǁĞƌĞƐĞĞŶƚŽďĞĞǆĂĐĞƌďĂƚĞĚďǇĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĚŽůůĂƌà?dŚĞà“ƚŚƌĞĂƚĨƌŽŵ:ĂƉĂŶà?ŚĂƐ
been noted by other AOS writers (for example, Armstrong, 1991; Dent, 1990; Ittner and Larcker, 
1997) as a rationale for accounting change.  It has been suggested that crises (manufactured and 
real) have been used to bring about neo-liberal changes (Klein 2007, Mirowski, 2013) or at least, to 
introduce neo-liberal reforms more quickly.   
 
The Caterpillar case brought into focus two important debates (inaccurately) characterised as a 
ĚĞďĂƚĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶà“ƚŚĞDĂƌǆŝƐƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ŽƵĐĂƵůĚŝĂŶƐ/ƉŽƐƚŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐƚƐà?which raged within the 
academic community during the 1990s (see for example, Armstrong, 1994; Marsden, 1998; Neimark, 
1990, 1994).  One of the issues at stake was the extent to which identities (selves, subjectivities) are 
discursively constituted (Armstrong, 2006, 2014).    The other concerned the emphasis which should 
be placed on the role of the economic system and the sources of power.   The two are dialectically 
related (Arnold, 1998; Froud et al, 1998). 
 
The extent to which accounting knowledge can produce altered subjectivities is an issue which is 
worthy of future research (see Armstrong, 2014).  Alvesson and Karreman (2004) argue that it is 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚĞŚŽǁƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝƐĨŽƌŵĞĚà“ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůůǇà?9.   Along similar lines, Arnold (1998) 
was concerned with the point of view of the shopfloor workers in the Caterpillar case, who in her 
account were very sceptical of and resistant to the management rhetoric of empowerment and 
economic citizenship.  The subjective responses of the Caterpillar workers to the programme to 
make them more entrepreneurial were produced in the context of ĂƚĞƌƉŝůůĂƌà?ƐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝǀĞ$1bn 
losses over the past three years and an implicit threat of more job losses.  The company had closed 
six US plants, reducing the headcount of hourly paid workers by 44% and that of salaried staffs by 
26% (Armstrong, 2006).  ƌŶŽůĚà?Ɛ (1998) Caterpillar staff interviews indicate that the workers were 
far more conscious of and influenced by the material threats of job loss and promises of job security 
than they were by abstract notions of workplace autonomy and self-actualization promised by the 
spatial reorganization of the plant into modular cells; the workers experienced the contradiction 
                                                          
9 Froud et al (1998) were, to some extent, also concerned with the construction of entrepreneurial subjects 
ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƐŽŵĞŽĨDŝůůĞƌĂŶĚKà?>ĞĂƌǇà?Ɛà?à?à?à?à?à?ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐà?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞZĞŝĐŚà?à?à?à?à?à?tŽŵĂĐŬĞƚĂůà?à?à?à?à?à?à?
Piore and Sabel, 1984; Hirst and Zeitlin, 1989) as promoters of the types of management technologies adopted 
by Caterpillar.  They too, saw the economic as an important animator in the case.   
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between the rhetoric of empowerment/entrepreneurialism and the insecurity they felt about their 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶà?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞà?dŚĞĂƚĞƌƉŝůůĂƌĐĂƐĞƉŽƐĞĂƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ the extent to which 
accounting technologies can impact upon the constitution of subjectivity.  Arnold (1998) strongly 
suggests that the creation of human capital entrepreneurial subjects involves a whole lot more than 
managerial control system changes.   
 
One of the concerns of Ahrens and Chapman (2007) study of a restaurant business is to discover the 
methods used to enable entrepreneurial behaviour on the part of the restaurant managers.   It was 
noted that head office managers were sensitive to the benefits of an approach to management 
control that sought to reckon with the intelligence of managersà? to enable them to act as 
entrepreneurs.   Ahrens and Chapman (2007) sees the subjectivities of the employees as changing 
through the construction of arrays of activity by area managers that incorporate corporate 
objectives ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞƐƚĂƵƌĂŶƚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐà?ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐà?   This research did not see 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĂƐďĞŝŶŐà“ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚà?ďǇƚŚĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŵĞƚƌŝĐƐà?ZĂƚŚĞƌà?ƚŚĂƚďǇ actively working with 
other organisational members, the metrics were drawn upon in order to establish a shared 
understanding of what it meant to do well.   For the neo-liberal entrepreneurial subject, the meaning 
of doing well is to maximize returns on their human capital.  With this understanding the restaurant 
case reveals the contradiction that entrepreneurial subjects can be entrepreneurial for themselves 
(against the interests of their employer).  Ahrens and Chapman (2007) noted that very good chefs 
could extract high salaries from their restaurant managers, just as commercially successful 
restaurant managers could attain legendary status even if there was widely shared, but unproven, 
suspicion ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇà‘à‘ƌŝƉƉĞĚŽĨĨƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇà?à?ďǇŬĞĞƉŝŶŐĂ share of the revenues to themselves.  
Perhaps this was a price the restaurant company was prepared to pay for innovative, profitable staff. 
 
The second debate invoked by the Caterpillar case - the importance of the à“ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐǇƐƚĞŵà?àW 
cannot be ignored.  dŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚà“ĚŽŐŵĂà?àW it is the contention here that capitalism shapes the world.  
There are imperatives that issue from the systemic drives of capitalism including the imperatives of 
cheapening labour, expanding markets, economic growth, and constant renovations in production to 
generate profit, and so forth.  As Brown (2015) cogently argues, if capitalism is omitted in any social 
analysis, it will not be possible to grasp the intricate dynamics between political rationality and the 
economic constraints, and it will be impossible to ŐƌĂƐƉƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚĂŶĚĚĞƉƚŚŽĨŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵà?Ɛ
power in making this world and unfreedom within it.  With respect to the Caterpillar case, Arnold 
(1998) argued that by abandoning historical materialism accounting research would lose its ability to 
confront the problems posed by capitaůŝƐŵà?tŚŝůĞ&ƌŽƵĚĞƚĂůà?à?à?à?à?à?à?ƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞĂƚĞƌƉŝůůĂƌ
case maintained an understanding of the importance of profitability by arguing that the first material 
legacy of the changes at Caterpillar was a modest increase in outsourcing, this was followed by 
massive reinvestment which left Caterpillar with re-equipped factories that could not work 
profitably under existing labour contracts10.   The drives of capitalism do not negate the importance 
of understanding the neo-liberal conception of humans as entrepreneurial capital units, but, any 
analysis of the rationalities of neo-liberalism need to be set within the context of the imperatives of 
capitalism. 
 
The Caterpillar case demonstrates the social contradictions brought about by the drive to 
entrepreneurialize staff while at the same time needing to control them.  Although individual work 
groups met regularly with management to share ideas about how to make things more cheaply and 
                                                          
10 Arnold (1998) notes that the economic context is used both to invoke co-operation as well as being used 
coercivĞůǇà?ƌŶŽůĚà?à?à?à?à?à?Ɖà?à?à?ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚà“à?à?ůĂďŽƵƌŵƵƐƚĐŽŶĐĞĚĞĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĐĂƉŝƚĂůĨůŝŐŚƚà?
Thus, union-management cooperation programs and concession bargaining represent two faces of the same 
factory regime; a regime that is built not oŶůǇŽŶĐŽŶƐĞŶƚà?ĂƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞĚŝŶDŝůůĞƌĂŶĚKà?>ĞĂƌǇà?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ
à“ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐŚŝƉà?à?ďƵƚĞƋƵĂůůǇŽŶĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐŽƌà?ĂƐƵƌĂǁŽǇà?à?à?à?à?à?Ɖà?à?à?à?à?ƚĞƌŵƐŝƚà?à“ĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ
ƚŽƐĂĐƌŝĨŝĐĞà?à?à? 
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quickly, the workforce did not staff the planning departments nor make strategic decisions.  One 
worker reported that after working hard to find ways to produce a particular component as cheaply 
ĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞà“à?ĨŝŶĂůůǇƚŚĞĐŽŵƉĂŶǇĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŽƵƐà?ǁŚĞŶǁĞƌĞĂůůǇƉŝŶŶĞĚƚŚĞŵĚŽǁŶà?ƚŚĞǇƐĂŝĚà?
well, the truth of the matter is that we need the space - we are moving something else into that area 
ĂŶĚŝĨǇŽƵĐŽƵůĚĚŽŝƚĨŽƌĨƌĞĞà?ǁĞà?ĚƐƚŝůůŚĂǀĞƚŽƐĞŶĚŝƚŽƵƚà?à?ƌŶŽůĚà?à?à?à?à?à?Ɖà?à?à?à?à?   This one small 
episode reflects the complex and contradictory nature of management control technologies 
targeted at entrepreneurial subjects.   
 
 
The complexity and contradictions of management control technologies in practice 
 
Other work in AOS has emphasised that in spite of the change in the targets of management control 
systems (towards individuals and teams), there remains the need for management to maintain its 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌďŽƚŚůĂďŽƵƌƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂŶĚĐŽƐƚƐà?ƌŝĞƌƐĂŶĚŚƵĂà?Ɛà?à?à?à?à?à?ƐƚƵĚǇŽĨĂŶAustralian 
Aluminium Company demonstrates how the company management came under the sway of an 
international consulting firm and Australian state initiatives to à“moderniseà? by acquiring an ABC 
system.  It sets out a fascinating picture of management as a semi chaotic and complex process.  
Two features seem to dominate the caƐĞà?ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚǁĂƐƚŚĞŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐĚĞƐŝƌĞďǇŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚà“ƚŽ
ĨŝŶĚƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƐà?ĂŶĚƐĞĐŽŶĚůǇà?ĂŶĚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůůǇà?à?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇďĞŚŝŶĚà?ƐĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞwas 
contingent on the figures it produced (whether correct or not) making the recommendation for the 
discontinuance of a recalcitrant machine.  In short, acceptance of ABC depended upon it producing 
figures to support desired decisions.    
 
The acquisition of the ABC system took place amid the Australian state promotion of à‘ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ
ĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐà?techniques like JIT/TQM.  One industrial engineer stated that the real driver behind the 
introduction of these new techniques was cycle time -- a euphemism for work intensification (Green 
and Yanarella, 1996).  Throughout the paper we can see seeds and reflections of an increase in 
individual worker accounting controls àW described in the case as à“prompt and reliable people related 
informationà? (including the incurrence of sick leave).  tŚŝůĞƌŝĞƌƐĂŶĚŚƵĂà?Ɛà?à?à?à?à?à?ƐƚƵĚǇŝƐƐĞĞŵůǇ 
concerned with the acquisition of new management accounting technology (an ABC system), it 
ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁĞƌĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚŵŽƌĞǁŝƚŚà“ŽůĚĨĂƐŚŝŽŶĞĚà?ĐŽƐƚĐŽŶƚƌŽůà?and 
valorisation of labour than with reconstructing the subjectivities of the workforce.   
 
Although Johnson and Kaplan (1987) argue the case for more accurate accounting information 
(through ABC), Hopper and Armstrong (1991) counter that if management is taken to be about the 
control of labour and of junior managers, the issue is more complex. This is not to argue that 
à“ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞĐŽƐƚƐà?ĂƌĞŶŽƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚďƵƚƚŚĂƚ, management accounting information is 
to be judged by the results which it achieves, rather than its notional accuracy.  For example, the 
classical literature on the behavioural aspects of budgets (e.g. Caplan, 1971) discusses the effects of 
setting targets at various levels of difficulty, not whether these levels are "correct" in some essential 
sense. Thus, the accuracy of budgets and internal attributions of cost might be regarded as 
irrelevant, so long as they serve to focus managerial effort in the directions desired by those who 
control the organisation.  This resonates with Alvesson and Karreman (2004) whose case study of a 
global consulting firm (Global) found that managers insisted that staff report working for eight hours 
a day irrespective of the number of additional hours they work.  This was because labour-hours is an 
important constituent of a key ratio by which management was judged -- the project margin.   In 
spite of a key component of the information system being entirely wrong, the management control 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇà“ǁŽƌŬĞĚà?(for shareholders and senior management) in the sense that for 
many staff, 70 hours weeks were the norm.  In some ways this is indicative of strongly neo-liberal 
rationality.  While under liberalism labour was a commodity to be purchased by the hour, under neo-
liberalism, staff are human capital units who provide a service and receive an income.   
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 Alvesson and Karreman (2004) argue that almost all control practices in Global include aspects of 
cultural engineering more or less geared towards the subjectivities of the staff.  The control systems 
take many different forms and are both financial and non-financial.  Socio-ideological controls 
feature strongly.  From the theoretical perspective of bio-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐà?'ůŽďĂůà?ƐƐŽĐŝŽ-ideological controls 
would have been enhanced by neo-ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵà?ƐĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌŝĂůƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐà?ŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ
expressed a strong desire to succeed.  The idea of being successful in a certain way is an outcome of 
social processes which extends beyond the boundaries of individual organisations.  In Global, success 
is equated with promotion speed, ranking, job titles, monetary and rewards; each of these could be 
seen as Lacanian mirrors.  Work in AOS (Roberts 1990, 1991, 2009) suggests that people are 
animated to maintain and enhance their self-esteem and their sense of security and this can be 
exploited by forms of power which offer control as a sense of security.    
 
The AOS work in this section presents a complex picture of attempts by management to organize 
and control labour and understand the costs of their activities.  These management concerns might 
have led companies (on the advice of consultants) to adopt new technical forms of accounting and 
control systems but the concerns of management and the contradictions of capitalism remain 
ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞůǇƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĂƐǁŚĞŶK^ďĞŐĂŶà?à?ǇĞĂƌƐà?ĂŐŽà?Although Caterpillar management 
claimed that it would not dictate to cells the method for reducing costs; nonetheless, the workforce 
did not have the option but to try to reduce costs.  Attempts by management to deliver value by 
exploiting the skill and expertise of its workforce in the work discussed here (particularly Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2007à?DŝůůĞƌĂŶĚKà?>ĞĂƌǇà?à?à?à?à?à?echoes scientific managementà?ƐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŽƌŬĞƌ
knowledge.   What is clear from the AOS work discussed in this section is that management 
accounting control systems act upon many workers intensively and continuously.  This reflects 
critical HR research what has found that organisational life for many is dominated by an 
unprecedented micro-measurement and management of individual performance (see for example, 
Carter et al, 2013; Scholarios and Taylor, 2014; Stewart et al, 2010).  Controls aimed at changing the 
subjectivity of workers have been adopted unevenly11 and their success at doing so remains an open 
question.  Resistance to entrepreneurialism is discussed further in the next section.   
   
 
Resistance to neo-liberalism 
 
Employees from many different industries and organisational levels, who are increasingly harangued 
ƚŽďĞà“ŵŽƌĞĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌŝĂůà?à?eg academics now have to raise funding, sell knowledge, deliver 
conferences, improve their personal ranking and so on) while at the same time subjected to 
increasingly detailed control systems, are finding work, if not a living death, a cause of 
anxiety/stress.  The academic literature offers few avenues of resistance.  Arnold (1998) notes the 
importance of trade unions and community in resisting the pressure of neo-liberalism, while other 
work attacks and lays-bare neo-liberalisms rationalities.   This stream of work in AOS will be 
considered first. 
 
 
The feminine and sexuality 
 
Shearer and Arrington (1993), drawing from the work of Luce Irigaray and her feminist 
deconstruction of Freudian and Lacanian work, while not specifically addressing biopolitics, drives a 
critical wedge into its rationalities, by suggesting that entreprenuerialism is masculine and animated 
                                                          
11 See for example Taylor (2013) which argues the performance management systems have been implemented 
with particular robustness in the finance industry. 
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by phallic desire (Burrell, 198712; Cooper, 1992).  Irigaray reads Western sexuality, economics and 
politics as beginning with some notion of desire.  To her, according to Western rationalities all desire 
is reduced to a singularity àW phallic desire (for example under neo-liberalism, we all deemed to have 
the same single desire àW to maximize returns on ourselves) and so society is reducible to a linear 
aggregation of humans with the same desire.  What Irigaray challenges is the way in which the 
phallocratic character of both sexuality and economics, excludes from view the possibility of a 
multiplicity of desires and values (sexual desire as something other than penile/phallic desire and 
economics as something other than appropriative self-interest).  Shearer and Arrington (1993) argue 
that inasmuch as accounting is discourse, an enactment of a particular language of economic 
activity, it codifies and orchestrates economic participation in accordance with a telos that governs 
the place of participants in the economy.  
 
Shearer and Arrington (1993) ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞà“ĞƌĂƐƵƌĞà?ŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇŝƐexplained by Marxist theory àW 
the value of the thing-in-itself is liquidated through a singular telos of its value in exchange, 
ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞĨŽƌĐĂƉŝƚĂůà?dŚĞǇŐŽŽŶƚŽƐƚĂƚĞà?Ɖà?à?à?à?à?à?à?à“dŽďĞŝŶƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇŝƐƚŽƐƵďũĞĐƚŽŶĞà?ƐƐĞůĨƚŽ
the grammar of accounting, ... It is to be assigned a role as inscribed within the numbers, norms and 
ǀĂƌŝĂŶĐĞƐŽĨĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝŶŐà?ƚŽďĞŵĂƌŬĞĚĂƐĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚŽƌŝŶĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚà?ĂƐĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞŽƌĚĞǀŝĂŶƚà?ǁŚŝĐŚ
ĂůǁĂǇƐà?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶà?ƚĂŬĞƐĂƐŝƚƐƚĞůŽƐƚŚĞĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞůĨĨŽƌĐĂƉŝƚĂůà?à?  Thus 
Shearer and Arrington (1993) set out an understanding of accounting as an objectifier of humanity.  
To objectify a human being in the name of teleology (efficiency, profit etc), is to presume that 
human value and desirability is enhanced when it takes a form other than its own.  According to the 
teleology of neo-liberalism, humans are valuable if they earn the maximum return on themselves àW if 
they are not productive (in a very specific sense of the word), they are not valuable. A human being 
is no longer the subject of her own value or her own desires.  She is an object of the telos presumed 
to govern her from outside of herself.    Resistance means rejecting this telos and embracing the rich 
life-affirming flows of multiplicity.  Shearer and Arrington (1993) proposes that our bodies are not 
human capital àW they are multiple sites of pleasure.   
 
In a similar vein, Roberts (2005) offers the insight that when confronted by performance metrics, 
one should not fall into the Lacanian mirror but remember that we are not our performance metrics 
àW we are much more complex and wonderful than the ludicrous, impoverished reflection which they 
offer.  Roberts (1990, 1991) suggests that socialising (rather than hierarchical) accountability offers a 
more complete recogŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƐĞůĨà?ZŽďĞƌƚƐà?à?à?à?à?à?à?Ɖà?à?à?à?à?ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐà“ĂĨŽƌŵŽĨ
organizational talk which constantly threatens to dissolve the preoccupation with the objective 
boundaries of self which hierarchical accountability encourages, and instead offers a confirmation of 
ƐĞůĨĂƐĂĐƚŝǀĞƐƵďũĞĐƚà?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵǇĞƚŝŶĂƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞŽŶŽƚŚĞƌƐà?à?ƌŶŽůĚà?à?à?à?à?à?
sees trade unions as an important socialising conduit for the resistance of neo-liberal rationalities. 
 
Trade unions and material circumstances 
 
ƌŶŽůĚà?à?à?à?à?à?Ɖà?à?à?à?ĂƌŐƵĞƐà?ƚŚĂƚƉĞŽƉůĞà“ŶŽƚŽŶůǇƌĞĨůĞĐƚà?ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚƚŚĞŝƌƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ
in terms of traditions and class solidarities, they also integrate their experiences at work into other 
aspects of their personal lives as parents, ĨĂŵŝůǇà?ĂŶĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇŵĞŵďĞƌƐà?à?/ŶĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌǀĞŝŶà?
Ezzamel et al (2004) highlight the importance of employees in shaping the production process.  
Armstrong (1994) notes that research (eg Nichols and Beynon, 1977; Burawoy, 1979) has shown very 
little sign ŽĨƚŚĞƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚƐĂƚƵƌĂƚŝŽŶŽŶǁŽƌŬĞƌƐà?ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐďǇƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐŽĨ
disciplinary power.  Workers have always created their own language, rhetoric, and symbols, often 
                                                          
12 Burrell (1987) saw accounting and sexuality as being diametrically opposed.  Taking a broader view of 
management control, Burrell saw the accounting of time and of the body as the suppression and repression of 
(sexual) interrelationships which threaten rational-calculative techniques.  
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appropriating the management vocabularies, subverting meanings, and adding irony and sarcasm.  
So, for example, in the Caterpillar case, tŚĞà“WůĂŶƚtŝƚŚa &ƵƚƵƌĞà?à?Wt&à?ǁĂƐĚƵďďĞĚƚŚĞà“WůĂŶƚ
with Ă&ĞŶĐĞà?ƚŽĚĞŶŽƚĞƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ-fence erected around the plant to protect it from protests. The 
union-management-cooperation-progƌĂŵà?à“ŵƉůŽǇĞĞ^ĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶWƌŽĐĞƐƐà?à?^Wà?à?ĐŽŶǀĞƌƚĞĚƚŽ
à“ĂƐŝůǇ^ƵĐŬĞƌĞĚWĞŽƉůĞà?à?ĂƚĞƌƉŝůůĂƌà?Ɛ listing of protected jobs, --à“ƐĞĐƵƌĞĚĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞůŝƐƚà?ďĞĐĂŵĞ
ƚŚĞà“ƐŚƌŝŶŬŝŶŐ employee listà?13.    
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The neo-liberal vision of humanity as individual enterprise units whose sole value is in their ability to 
produce an income stream is horrific.   This is a vision in which our most human characteristics 
(empathy, compassion, sexuality, and so on) are not considered to be valuable unless someone is 
willing to pay for them. Humans lose their standing as simply being valuable as humans who should 
be granted equal rights and respect.  It is not suggested here that the neo-liberal view perspective is 
universally shared, internalised or indeed adopted; the neo-liberal project is incomplete and 
profound social understandings are slow to change.  However, it is a rationality which a range of 
powerful institutions are working very hard to promote, sell and use.  The neo-liberal rationality that 
the state should not pursue social welfare policies means that many citizens are being left without 
social support and this brings a material force to attempts to create more entrepreneurial subjects.  
In accounting, new management control strategies and technologies are being developed (Davila et 
al, 2009à?à?ƐŽůĚĂŶĚĂĚŽƉƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞà“ƵŶĚĞŶŝĂďůǇŵŽƌĂůà?ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌŝĂůŝƐŵ
among staff.  This may be described at the ultimate neo-liberal moment in which organisations use 
the rhetoric of ethical business while their workforce suffer from increased workloads, intense work 
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚà?ƵŶƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚĞĚĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞà?ƐƚƌĞƐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĨĞĂƌŽĨà“ŵĂŶĂŐĞĚĞǆŝƚà?(Cederstrom and 
Fleming, 2012; Malsch 2013).   
 
The work in AOS reviewed here has done an outstanding job in charting accounting changes from 
systems concerned with costs to ones oriented towards micro-measurement, micro management, 
ratings, rankings and scores.  It highlights the roles of management consultants in selling and globally 
dispersing control technologies; the role of the state in promoting the technologies and rationalities 
of neo-liberalism; the role of agency theory and its relationship to control systems; the possibilities 
for different forms of resistance; the contradictions of capitalism and its antagonistic nature which 
no management control system can overcome; the fleeting satisfactions which management control 
systems can give to managers; and how management control systems can individualise and create 
anxiety.   
 
/ŶŽƌĚĞƌĨŽƌK^ƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽĨƵůĨŝůŝƚƐĂŝŵƚŽďĞà“concerned with all aspects of the relationship 
between accounting and human behaviour, organizational structures and processes, and the 
changing social and politicaůĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞà?à?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶĞĞĚĨŽƌŵŽƌĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚǁŚŝĐŚ
considers the perspective of employees at all levels of the organisational hierarchy.   Future research 
should be mindful of the gender, race, sexuality and age related concerns associated with the impact 
of management control; all of these are disappointingly absent from AOS thus far.  There is little in 
K^ǁŚŝĐŚƐĞĞƐǁŽƌŬĂƐƚŚĞà“ůŝǀŝŶŐĚĞĂƚŚà?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚƐŽƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůůǇďǇCederstrom and Fleming 
(2012).  In this respect too it would be wonderful to have more case studies which empathise with 
humans, instead of seeing them as targets of various forms of stimuli designed to make them work 
harder.  It is also essential that AOS research does not accept the status quo as given, and continues 
to question the legitimacy of the power and takes class as the analytic basis for alienation and 
exploitation. 
                                                          
13 As McNally (1995, pp. 23-24) observes, such linguistic inversions are neither arbitrary nor random; they are 
typical of shop floor à“ĐƵůƚƵƌĞƐŽĨƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞà?à? 
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